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THE POUR OVER AS AN ESTATE PLANNING
DEVICE-AND ITS AVAILABILITY IN
NORTH DAKOTA
I. INTRODUCTION

North Dakota in 1961 enacted a Uniform Testamentary
Additions to Trusts Act' identical to that adopted by the
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1960. 2 The purpose
of this act was to alleviate problems which arise from the
doubt that exists as to whether the pour over provisions' in
a will to an inter vivos trust are valid in view of the general
requirements of the statute of wills.
In recent years the pour over provision has become the
4
most controversial of all current estate planning devices.
There are many variations of the pour over but the most
common one arises when a man executes a will in which it
is provided that his estate, or a part of it, shall be distributed
to an inter vivos trust created by the testator or another,
either contemporaneously with, or prior to the execution of
the will. Difficulties are encountered when the trust is amendable or revocable or both; and the controversy is highlighted
when the testator thereafter amends the trust but leaves the
will untouched.
Although not a new concept, the attempt to make a gift
by will to an existing trust has made its most significant
gains in the past generation.' Much credit for the progress
1.
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 56-07-01 to -04 (Supp. 1961).
2.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONEl1S ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 198-99 (1960).
is
3.
A provision in a will adding property to an inter vivos trust
called a "pour over" provision. See STEPHENSON, DRAFTING WILLS
AND TRUST AGREEMENTS § 19.1 (1955). Pour over provisions may also
be used to pour over from a will to another will, from a trust
to another
trust,
and from a trust
to a will. See In re Fowles' Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118
N.E. 611 (1918); In re Piffard's Estate, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888).
4.
For a general discussion of this device see SHATTUCK & FARR,
AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 13 (2d ed. 1953); CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 90-261 (3d ed. 1961); BOWE, ESTATE PLANNING AND
TAXATION § 6.30 (1st ed. 1957).
5.
See Johnson v. Ball, 5 De G. & Sm. 85, 64 Eng. Rep. 1029 (Ch. 1851)
which is one of the earliest cases involving a writing in the form of a
trust
in which the will referred to a memorandum to trustees "to hold the
same upon the uses appointed by letter signed by them and myself." Most
American litigation has arisen since the decision in the leading case of
Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921).
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of the pour over must be given to the text writers who have
advocated its acceptance. 6 However, the credit owing to
its inherent advantages, and to the sound reasons attorneys
and testators have for implementing it, should not be forgotten.
For an insight into the desire for its implementation consider
some of the following:
(1) the grantor without relinquishing
control over his property may test the plan which will control
his estate after his death; (2) it permits the unified administration of trust and probate property; (3) it may eliminate
the cost of administration on the property added to the trust;
(4) it avoids otherwise necessary court supervision; (5) it
simplifies management and administration of the estate; (6)
publicity may be avoided concerning the family and business
plans which otherwise would become part of the public record
upon admission to probate; (7) it assures elderly property
owners of professional 'management and counsel when
management and investment burdens become heavy; (8) it
may reduce income, estate and inheritance taxes; and (9), in
general, it affords much flexibility in the disposition of probate
7
assets.
Despite its short career this device has encountered much
litigation" and critical comment.9 The primary objection
to the testamentary pour over provision is found in its attempt
to dispose of property in accordance with provisions not found
in the will and not embodied in a writing executed with the
formalities required by the statute of wills." °
As the cases involving this objection were litigated the
courts tried to measure this device within the framework of
certain doctrines already well known and generally accepted
in the law of wills. To explore the legal justification and
6.

See I SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956); Evans, Nontestamentar3
Peference. 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 635 (1949); Mcto an Existing Trust, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 267 (1959);

Acts and Incorporation By

Clanahan, Requests

Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos

Trust,

50 Mich. L. Rev. 33 (1951); Polasky, "Pour-Over" Wills, 98 Trusts & Estates
949 (1959); Shattuck, Some Practical Aspects of the Problems of the Alterable and Revocable Inter Vivos Trust in Massachusetts, 26 B.U.L. Rev.

437 (1946).
7. See McClanahan, op. cit. supra note 6, at 268.
8. See generally SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 6, § 54.3.
9.
See Lauritzen, Can a Revocable T.rust Be Incorporated by Reference?, 45 Il1. L. Rev. 583 (1950); Shattuck, "Paur Over" Trusts-A Renewed
Warning to Draftsmen, 91 Trusts & Estates 207 (1952).
10. See Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 Ati. 1058 (1907); In Atwood
v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.. supra note 5, the court held the attempted gift to the trustee by the residuary clause of the will to be void.
stating that the plan of the will and the trust was obnoxious to the statute
of wills.
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background of the testamentary dispositions it becomes necessary to examine the two doctrines most frequently used to
uphold the pour over disposition in the absence of statute,
namely, the doctrine of incorporation by reference and the
doctrine of independent legal significance.
It should be noted that if the provisions of the testamentary trust are set out in full in the will, without reference to
or reliance on the provisions of the inter vivos trust, no concern need be given to the exceptions found in the doctrine to
be discussed.
II.

INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE

Incorporation by reference, a long recognized exception
to the requirements of the statute of wills, is a judicially
constructed doctrine which provides that a validly executed
will may, by appropriate language, incorporate another document even though the incorporated document does not satisfy
the statutory requirements regarding wills.1 The courts are
in general accord that there can be no incorporation unless
five conditions are satisfied: (1) the incorporating document
must describe the writing with reasonable certainty; (2) the
writing must be described as in existence when the incorporating document is executed;
(3) the will must evidence an
intention of the testator to incorporate the document; (4) the
writing must conform to the description contained in the incorporating document; and (5) the writing in fact must have
been in existence when the incorporating document was executed. 12 The absence of any of the above is considered fatal
3
to incorporation by reference.1
There are no additional requirements that the writing be
of any particular type, that it possess any independent legal
efficacy, or that the writing be signed by the testator or any
other person. Consequently, the extrinsic documents which
have been presented to the courts for incorporation are of
various types. Some of the more common are: the executed
11. See Newton v. Seaman's Friend Soc'y, 130 Mass. 91, 39 Am. Rep. 433
(1881); ATKINSON, WILLS § 80 (2d ed. 1953); 2 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE
ON WILLS § 19.17 (3d ed. 1960); Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration and Non-Testamentary Act, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 879 (1925).
12. See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 11, § 80; 2 BOWE-PARKER. op.
cit. supra note 11, § 19.18.
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wills of others,14 prior invalid wills or, more precisely, papers
in the form of a will of the testator, 15 undelivered deeds,"6
contracts,17 and, of particular importance here, trust instruments.' s
Incorporation by reference, generally accepted in England
and most American jurisdictions, 9 had its beginning prior to
the enactment of the Wills Act in 1837.20 The doctrine has
previously been rejected in Connecticut; 2" however, Louis-

iana 2' and New Jersey, -3 stating they do not recognize it,
have reached results similar to incorporation.24 The remaining jurisdictions either accept the doctrine or have not been
confronted with it.

Apparently North Dakota falls in the

latter category."
III.

INDEPENDENT

LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

The doctrine of independent legal significance permits a

court to refer to facts which exist apart from the will to
determine the meaning of provisions in the will. 26

It is based

on the fact that courts must often receive evidence of acts
and events extraneous to the will in order to clarify the meaning of the provisions contained therein.

The requirements

14. Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925); Clark v. Dennison, 283 Pa. 285, 129 AtI. 94 (1925).
15. Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore P.C. 427, 14 Eng. Rep. 757 (1858). The
incorporation of a prior invalid will should be distinguished from the
revival of a prior valid, though perhaps revoked, will.
16. In re Dimmitt's Estate, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N.W.2d 752 (1942).
17. Allday v. Cage, 148 S.W. 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
18.
In re Willey's Estate, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (1900): In re York's
Estate, 65 A.2d 282 (N.H. 1949).
19. See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 385.
20. The incorporation doctrine originated before extensive formalities for the execution of wills were required by the Statute of Frauds,
1677. See Molineux v. Molineux, 4 Cr. Jac. 144, 79 Eng. Rep. 126 (1605).
Application of the doctrine was seldom questioned in England until the
Wills Act, 1837, added the requirement that wills be "signed at the end".
21. Hatheway v. Smith, supra note 10. A Connecticut statute now permits the incorporation of living trust provisions into a will. Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 45-173-173A (Supp. 1961).
22. Succession of Ledet, 170 La. 449, 128 So. 273 (1930).
23. Murray v. Lewis, 94 N.J. Eq. 681, 121 Atl. 525 (Ch. 1923).
24. Hessmer v. Edenborn, 196 La. 575, 199 So. 647 (1940); Swetland v.
Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 Atl. 822 (Ch. 1926). The early New York
cases recognized the doctrine, see Robert v. Corning, 89 N.Y. 225 (1882).
but in a more recent case, Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E.
238 (1891), the court refused to recognize the doctrine. Later New York
modified its position in In re Rausch's Will, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755
where the court said that the doctrine against incorporation of unattested
documents "should not be carried to a dryly logical extreme."
25. But see In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300 (1948)
where an extrinsic instrument specifically referred to in will and duly
identified is admissible to aid in construction of will.
26. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956): STEPHENSON, DRAFTING
WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS § 19.7 (1955).
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for implementing this doctrine are best formulated by the
following statement:
"Beneficiaries may be pointed out generally in a
will and may be limited and more precisely defined
by a subsequent non-testamentary act. The will should
(a) purport to dispose of the property; and (b) provide directions for determining the identity of the beneficiaries by giving a general description of them; but
(c) the means so provided should not be any act
whose sole or chief purpose is that of complementing
the will. It should have the force
and effect of an
27
independent legal transaction."
This rule may be applied to a general description of
property subject to testamentary disposition as well.
At this point it might be well to note the distinction between this doctrine and the one of incorporation by reference.
Where the latter permits certain extrinsic writings to be read
as part of a will, the doctrine of independent legal significance
permits certain facts to be shown in order to determine the
beneficiaries and bequests of a will. The writing, in order to
satisfy the incorporation by reference doctrine, must have been
in existence at the time the will was executed. Whereas,
under the independent legal significance doctrine, the fact may
exist by virtue of acts performed either prior to, or subsequent
to, the execution of the will. Almost any court would readily
admit eittrinsic evidence to determine the beneficiaries of a
devise to "my wife," or to "my children." Also, despite the
fact the court in determining the beneficiaries must refer
to facts which exist independent of the will, there is little
question as to the validity of bequests such as: to "such
persons as shall be in my employ at my death, 2 S to "the
party or parties . . .who may be farming my farm and taking
care of me at the time of my death, '2 9 or to "such person
as shall maintain me and furnish me with medical treatment
3
while I live."
Gifts by location are also sustained under this doctrine.
These are best illustrated in cases where the testator be27.

Evans, op. eit. supra note 11, at 902,-03.

28.

In

29.
30.

In re Reinheirmer's Estate, 265 Pa 185, 108 At. 412 (1919).
Dennis v. Holsapple. 148 Ind. 297, 47 N.E. 631 (1897)1.

re Hollingsworth's Estate, 37 Cal. App. 2d 432. 99 P.2d 599 (1940).
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queaths the contents of a specified trunk, 31 or of a safe deposit
box. 3 2 The testator may increase or diminish the contents
of the receptacle after the will is executed, but the resulting
inference that the alterations were made solely for the purpose
3
of modifying the will may give rise to difficulties.
Following the same reasoning the "independent significance" test has been used to sustain the "pour over" by viewing the identities of the trustee and the trust agreement as
facts of independent significance. 34 The trust agreement
affects the property held inter vivos and consequently has
significance unrelated to the disposition of property under the
will.
In analyzing the situations where, in absence of statute,
the above doctrines were used to sustain pour overs from a
will into a living trust, categorization of the nature of the
trust itself becomes necessary. These situations shall be considered in a sequence based upon the degree of difficulty to
which they give rise.
A. The Irrevocable Unamendable Trust Pouring over to
an irrevocable trust not subject to amendment or modifications 35 would seem to give rise to little difficulty, the
disposition being sustained under either of the two doctrines.
The leading case In re Rausch's Will, 3 6 wherein the testatorsettlor bequeathed a portion of his residuary estate to the
trustee of a previously executed, unamendable and irrevocable
inter vivos trust in the following manner:
"[U] nder the same terms and conditions embodied
in the Trust Agreement . . . the principal to be disposed of as contained in the said agreement, and
which agreement is hereby made part of this my will,
as if fully set forth herein."
Appeal of Magoohan, 117 Pa. 238, 14 Atl. 816 (1887).
31.
In re Thompson, 217 N.Y. 111, 111 N.E. 762 (1916).
32.
See Hastings v. Bridge, 86 N.H. 247, 166 Atl. 273 (1933) where the
33.
of both beneficiary and property
court held that sufficient desination
given him is essential to a valid legacy.
34.
SCOTT, op et. supra note 27, at 376-77.
N.D. Cent. Code § 59-02-18 (1961) provides: "A trust cannot be re35.
voked by the trustor after its acceptance. actual or presumed, by the
trustee and beneficiaries, without the consent of all the beneficiaries, unreserves a power of revocation to the trustor
less the declaration of trust
and in that case the power must be strictly pursued."
258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932); see President and Directo.s
36.
of MVanhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174. 21 N.Y.S.2d 232. at 236
involved in the Rausch case
(1940), where the court said that the trust
was unamendable and irrevocable.
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The New York Court upheld the bequest despite the fact that
they had, in earlier decisions, refused to recognize the

Doctrine of Incorporation by Reference. 37 It would seem
that Justice Cardozo in delivering the opinion relied to some
degree upon both doctrines.38

Though this situation would

seem to give rise to a clear case of incorporation by reference,
the trust's existence prior to the execution of the will was not
stressed nor was the fact that it was irrevocable and unamendable mentioned in the opinion.
B. The Revocable, Amendable Trust In a situation which
involves "pouring over" to an inter vivos trust which is revocable and subject to amendment or modification, 39 some difficulties are encountered. As to the validity of the revocable
trust the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 4" overruled an earlier decision 4' and held
that a reservation by the settlor of the power to control investments did not impair the validity of the trust and such trust
was not a testamentary disposition despite its failure to
comply with the statute of wills. The weight of modern
42
decisions supports this view.
In cases where the revocable trust has never in fact been
amended or revoked the courts have generally validated the
pour over from the will to the trust under both incorporation
by reference 4 ' and independent legal significance. 44 Where
37.
E.g., Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891).
38. See SCOTT, op. ct. supra note 26, at 370.
39.
A typical example is where the testator has transferred property to
a trustee in trust
for another but the testator has, by express terms in
the trust
instrument, reserved the power to revoke or amend the trust
and if he does revoke, the corpus of the trust is returned to him. Variations may arise depending upon who has the revoking power. See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 94 (3d ed. 1961).
40.
315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944).
41.
McEvoy v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50. 87 N.E.
465 (1909) held that an inter vivos trust
is invalid because it is in substance testamentary. See also Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings and Trust Co..
183 Wis. 156, 196 N.W. 829 (1924).
42.
Randall v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n, 48 Cal.
App. 2d 249, 119 P.2d 754 (1941); Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust
Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 At]. 139 (1929); National Shawmut Bank v. Joy.
315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944); Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73. 1 N.W.2d
458 (1942); Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R.I. 72, 78 Atl. 535 (1911); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 57 (1959).
43.
Montgomery v. Blanken-hip, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d (1950). But
see Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir.
1921), cert. denied 257 U.S. 661 (1922).
44. Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928). The
court, although doubtful as to whether the doctrine of incorporation by
reference was applicable in New Jersey, held the trust valid because the
trust
instrument, being non-testamentary, might be referred to in order
to ascertain and give effect to the terms of the trust, thus recognizing
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the revocable trust has been amended prior to the execution
of the will it seems apparent that again both doctrines could
be applied to sustain the pour over if it can be shown that
the testator's intention is that the property be disposed of in
accordance with the trust terms as they existed at the time
45
the will was executed.
C. The Revocable, Amendable Trust, Amended Subsequent to Will The greatest difficulties in this area arise in
pouring over from a will to a revocable, amendable, inter
vivos trust and subsequently attempting to amend the trust.
In such a situation it is obvious that the provision cannot be
upheld under the incorporation by reference doctrine because
the amended trust was not in existence at the time the will
was executed. 46 Equally obvious is the validity of the amendment if made by codicil which meets the formalities required
by the statute of wills. Here application of incorporation by
reference or independent legal significance is not necessary
47
to establish the validity of the amendment.
The decisions indicate that the courts have generally refused to uphold a pour over into a trust as amended subsequent
to the execution of the will. 48 In the case of Old Colony Trust
Company v. Cleveland,49 where subsequent to the execution of the will the trust was modified without the formalities required for testamentary disposition, the court held that
the bequest should be subject to the terms of the trust as they
were at the time the will was executed. A liberalizing trend
began with the case of Matter of Ivie,50 where the New York
Court upheld a bequest to an existing trust which had undergone minor administrative changes subsequent to the execution of the will. Exemplifying this trend is Second BankState Street Trust Company v. Pinion,51 where the testator
created an inter vivos trust, reserving a power to amend or
the independent legal significance of the trust. See also In re Willey's
Estate, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (1900); in re York's Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65
A.2d 282 (1949); In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 54(i) (1959).
46. Ibild.
47. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.3, at 373 (2d ed. 1956): Stouse v. First National Bank, 312 Ky. 405. 245 S.W.2d 914 (1952).
48. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935):
Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934).
49. 291 Mass. 380. 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
50. 4 N.Y.2d 725. 149 N.E.2d 725. 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958).
51. 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960): accord. Canal Nat'l Bank v.
Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 Atl. 2d' 919 (1961).
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revoke. Thereafter he executed his will which left the residue
of his estate to the trustee to be used according to the terms
of the trust. Later the testator executed an unattested instrument which altered the beneficial interest in the trust property. Upon request by the executor for instructions as to
whether or not the residue passed to the trustees to hold
under the trust as amended, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held, without the aid of statute, that the bequest passed
to the trustee to be held under the terms of the amended
trust. In reaching this decision the Court said:
"...
we agree with modern legal thought that a
subsequent amendment is effective because of the
applicability of the established equitable doctrine that
subsequent acts of independent significance do not
require attestation under the statute of wills." 52
Thus the Pinion case has the distinction of being the first to
hold, without the aid of statute, that bequests can pass according to the dispositive terms of an unattested amendment made
after the execution of the will.
Looking back, we see that the pour over has encountered
great difficulties in the courts and its chances for survival
have often looked quite dim. The accomplishment, however,
in the Pinion case, absent any aid from statute, would seem
to indicate that it has at least endured the struggle if not won
the battle. This decision and the recent enactment, since
1953, of statutes in several states which authorize it in some
form 53 indicate the growing acceptance and approval of the
pour over.
An examination of the case law reveals a "confused and
confusing area of the law ' ' 54 especially in situations where
the trust has been amended subsequent to the execution of
the will. Of the statutes enacted to remove these uncertainties only the most liberal ones have accomplished that effect.
It is submitted that the only statutes which are of any real
52.
Second Bank-State Street Trust Co.
170 N.E.2d at 352 (1960).
53.
See BOGERT, TRUST & TRUSTEES §
down of recently enacted statutes permitting
a trust
previously established.
54.
McClanahan, Bequests to an Existing
291 (1959).

v.

Pinion,,

supra

note

51,

106 (Supp. 1962) for breakgift by will to a trustee of
Trust, 47 Calif. L.

Rev.

267,

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39

value to the estate planner are those declaring that a pour
over may be sustained under either of the alternate grounds
of incorporation by reference or independent significance thus
alleviating the uncertainty as to the validity of amendments
whether made prior to, or subsequent to the execution of the
will. It would seem that the North- Dakota statute has accomplished these effects. The statute in pertinent part reads:
A devise or bequest . . . may be made by a will to
the trustee . . . of a trust established . . . by the
testator . . . if the trust is identified in the testator's
will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument
other than a will, executed before or concurrently
with . . . the testator's will . . . regardless of the
existence, size or character of the corpus of the trust.
The devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the
trust is amendable or revocable . . . or because the
trust was amended after the execution of the will or
after the death of the testator . . . the property so
devised or bequeathed . . . shall become a part of the
trust . . . and . . . be . . . disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the instrument or will setting
forth the terms of the trust. 55
Although there are no North Dakota cases in point the enactment of the statute is probably evidence that the problem has
arisen on a non-judicial basis.
V. CONCLUSION

North Dakota's adoption of the Uniform Testamentary
Additions to Trust Act is a commendable addition to our
probate laws, overcoming many doubts concerning the pour
over. It is not suggested that this statute is an answer to all
the problems in this area. Necessarily some questions will
be left for the courts when the various factual situations come
before them. The court's construction of the statute remains
to be seen.
The significance of this statute to the North Dakota estate
planner is two fold: it opens wide the availability to them
55. N.D. Cent. Code § 56-07-01 (Supp. 1961); § 56-07-04 provides: "This
act shall have no effect upon any devise or bequest made by a will executed prior to the effective datje of this Act."
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of a very valuable estate planning device, the use of which
will withstand the test of litigation, and lastly, but perhaps
most important, it lessens any need for resort to court action.
RICHARD

H. ELWOOD

